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Interview with VIC ZAZERAJ  
 
Key:  
  
SO: = Sue Onslow (interviewer) 
VZ: = Vic Zazeraj (respondent) 
 
SO:  This is Dr. Sue Onslow talking to Mr. Vic Zazeraj at TransAfrica  
House in Johannesburg on the 15th of April 2013. Vic, thank you very 
much indeed for agreeing to talk to me. I wonder if you could begin by 
saying, please, how did you come to join the Department of Foreign 
Affairs in South Africa? 
 
VZ: Much to the despair of my parents I'm afraid. My father was a Polish airman 
stationed in the UK during the Second World War. My mother was English, 
and after the War my parents immigrated to Cape Town. I did not become an 
engineer or a lawyer, or a doctor as my parents would have preferred. I 
studied political science and political history and philosophy. I was doing post-
graduate studies at the University of Cape Town when I got married and then 
I had to find a real job. 
 
I applied at the Department of Foreign Affairs to undergo diplomatic cadet 
training, and to see if I could make a career in the Foreign Service. I joined 
the Foreign Service in 1974 in Pretoria at a time when John Vorster was still 
the prime minister. Dr. Hilgard Muller was the Minister of Foreign Affairs and it 
was a particularly crucial time in the history of southern Africa. The coup 
d'état had occurred in Lisbon in April of that year. It heralded the withdrawal 
of Portuguese interest from Mozambique and Angola. Suddenly the strategic 
equation in southern Africa was fundamentally altered. 
 
 So it was a very interesting time to join the Department of Foreign Affairs. 
What fascinated me at the time was that I was of a generation of young South 
Africans who believed that the country had a future: that we could find a way 
out of the political dead-end we were in at the time. It took another 20 years, 
from 1974 to 1994, but the people who were joining the foreign service at the 
time and going into politics at the time were the same generation as Roelf 
Meyer, Leon Wessels and others. We were all of the same generation, all 
believing that there was a way out: that the two fundamental forces in this part 
of the world which were Afrikaner nationalism on the one hand, and African 
nationalism on the other; were not necessarily destined to be permanently at 
loggerheads; that there was a way to find accommodation and find a future 
for South Africa. 
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 The one who was articulating that view and inspiring most of us at the time 
was Pik Botha himself, who had been a Foreign Service officer for a long 
time. He had gone into politics and in his first maiden speech in Parliament 
had made the statement that South Africa should associate itself with the 
Universal Declaration of Human rights. He said a number of other things 
which inspired my generation to become involved in making some kind of 
contribution to South Africa’s future. So that’s how I landed up as a young 
cadet in the Department of Foreign Affairs. 
 
SO:  Was the Department of Foreign Affairs, at that particular time, a natural 
recruiting point as far as the South African public service was 
concerned for English speaking South Africans? I'm just wondering if 
there was a particular English-speaking cohort among the wider white 
population that was attracted to it because it was the outward looking of 
all the civil service departments. 
 
VZ: That’s true; in fact the two departments in the civil service that attracted a 
larger number of English speaking South Africans were the Department of 
Defence - particularly the Navy and the Air force - and the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, that’s right; whereas many departments were almost 
exclusively Afrikaans. Those two were more or less a 50/50 which was a little 
unusual. So your question is spot on. 
 
SO:  Also you identified very much a new generation coming through, joining 
the DFA at that particular point, with Pik Botha as very much your 
guiding light in terms of looking for a way out, as you emphasize, of the 
dead-end policies of Apartheid. At that particular time could the National 
Party be divided into the Verlichte and the Verkrampte -? 
 
VZ: Yes. 
 
SO:  - sections? Or was it in fact a more complicated, a more complex 
political spectrum within the National Party? 
 
VZ: The party had already split in 1968 or ’69 over the sports policy. You 
remember the question of Basil D’Oliveira coming to play cricket in South 
Africa and the party had split over the question of mixed-race sports. The 
reconstituted National Party; in Afrikaans, the Herstigte Nasionale Party was 
formed, I think, round about 1969. The biggest preoccupation of the 
governing National Party at the time was not to allow that split to grow; in 
other words, to contain that split and it was at that point that Pik Botha 
decided to leave the relative security of the public service and go into a very 
uncertain future in politics. They gave him a constituency to stand in, the 
Wonderboom seat, which was held by one of those right wing leaders who 
had broken away. 
 
 Many people at the time thought he was simply being thrown to the sharks. 
There was no way he could beat an established figure like the sitting MP, but 
he did. He was very consistent in his message. He was very frank; he 
addressed meetings all over the constituency. He was very active, and he 
won that election against the odds. That was very inspiring for a younger 
generation of South Africans wondering whether there was a role for people 
like us going into government service, into public service. That was a very 
inspiring development for all of us. 
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 So to answer your question: the party split again some years later when the 
Conservative party of Andries Treurnicht was formed. The National Party at 
the time saw the biggest political threat to its continued control of government 
coming from the right. The African National Congress was not regarded as a 
political or military threat at that stage. Liberation struggle or no liberation 
struggle, they were not regarded as something that could defeat the State 
apparatus. 
 
SO:  So when did you join Pik Botha’s office as his particular political 
adviser/assistant. 
 
VZ: In 1981. I had been abroad. After my cadet training I was transferred to 
Malawi for a couple of years, and from there I was posted to Finland and 
spent three years in Helsinki. I came back in 1980 and at the time Pik 
Botha was looking for a new private assistant. So I was appointed at 
that time, in 1981. 
 
SO:  That was after the transition of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe to 
independence -? 
 
VZ: Yes. 
 
SO:  - leaving South Africa and south West Africa as very much the 
embattled southern part of the continent.   
 
VZ: Yes. 
 
SO:  This is also the era in which Apartheid South Africa was 
increasingly criticised in the Commonwealth and there were 
growing demands for economic sanctions, in addition to the 
military sanctions against South Africa.  Did you hold any 
particular view? Did your colleagues within DFA have a particular 
view, at this time, of the role, or the value, indeed the relative 
unimportance of the Commonwealth as far as South Africa was 
concerned? 
 
VZ: The Commonwealth was always regarded as important. South Africa 
had left the Commonwealth in 1961 to become a republic. But the fact 
that the Commonwealth continued to exist, continued to play a role and 
exert, particularly in Africa, a very strong footprint, was an obvious 
consideration. Its impact was never underestimated. The difficulty for 
Britain, and I think we all understood this in the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, was that they could not sacrifice relations with the rest of Africa 
or the developing world in favour of supporting Apartheid South Africa. 
 
 The values of the Commonwealth were simply not compatible with what 
was going on in this country. The dilemma that we had at the time was 
that here you had the Commonwealth which incorporated no end of 
military dictatorships, one party States, States where no black person 
had any rights whatsoever. In fact, I remember a Nigerian diplomat 
telling me at the UN that oddly enough the only country in Africa where 
a black man could take his own government to court and win was 
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Apartheid South Africa. You couldn’t try that in Zambia or Tanzania or 
Kenya, or Nigeria or anywhere else. 
 
 So we had a very strange set of circumstances where the dilemma was 
that it wasn’t the fact that black people were denied their political rights 
in South Africa. The question was who was denying them their rights? If 
they were denied those rights by a black government, that was okay. So 
if you were denied the right to vote in Uganda or in Cameroon or 
somewhere else, that was acceptable. If it was a white government 
denying those rights, that was not acceptable. 
 
SO:  So there was a difference between racial justice and absolute 
justice? 
 
VZ: This became a tricky issue in South Africa. It was something we 
grappled with. We also understood that this was a very complex issue 
for the Commonwealth and that the Commonwealth was trying to play a 
useful and constructive role. 
 
SO:  When you say “we”, are you talking about the junior ranks of the 
DFA? 
 
VZ: Yes. We’re also talking about the Minister’s office in the Department of 
Foreign Affairs where these issues were discussed because the 
message coming to us from the Commonwealth was that we were 
running out of time. South Africa had to start demonstrating positive 
steps towards some kind of conclusive, some kind of acceptable 
solution in the country. 
 
 The National Party government was saying; how do we do this? How do 
we persuade our constituency that the question of developing a road 
map towards majority rule will mean that we will find acceptance in the 
Commonwealth? But we will look like Zambia, or our country will look 
like Nigeria. Now what is the choice? Do you want be a member of the 
Commonwealth and look like Zambia where people are starving and 
there’s nothing in the shops? There’s a complete economic meltdown. 
There’s no free press, no political freedom, there’s no nothing. It’s a one 
party State, but it is acceptable to the Commonwealth. Is that what you 
want? That’ll give you acceptance in the Commonwealth, but imagine 
what our country will look like. 
 
 Now that became a real political debate within the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and also within the Foreign Affairs Committee of 
Parliament at the time. These were issues they were talking to us about. 
How do we bridge this gap? So the dilemma was how do we tell our 
people, the people who vote for the National Party, that we are now 
embarking on a path that is going to lead to something looking like 
Uganda under Idi Amin or Tanzania under Julius Nyerere, but that will 
give us international acceptance. There’s no way the white electorate of 
this country would ever accept that. 
 
 That debate was overtaken by events because the coup in Portugal and 
the withdrawal of the Portuguese military from this part of the world, 
from Angola and Mozambique, and the independence of Zimbabwe, had 
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changed the strategic security situation. The debate then became a 
survival question. It became a question of military survival and an 
existential issue. So the political debate was put to one side and the 
issue of the day became; we have to fight our way out of this and we 
need to do so from a position of strength. And when we’ve resolved this 
issue we can then come back to solving the political problem. So that 
was the thinking. 
 
SO:  I'm interested with your presentation of this. I totally take your 
point about the existential crisis following on from the isolation of 
South Africa after Pretoria’s intervention in Angola in 1975 to the 
extent to which you were traduced in the United Nations, and yet 
the discussion in the Organisation of African States was very 
much an evenly balanced one in seeking South Africa’s gradual 
withdrawal, rather than an immediate withdrawal. But by the 
beginning of the 1980s this was the era of the cautious reform 
which leading to the creation of the tri-cameral parliament in 1983. 
 
 Even though there was the renewed emphasis on the need for 
defence, and a ‘total national strategy’ to deal with ‘total national 
onslaught’, with the focus of discussion and debate increasingly 
within the State Security Council, still there were early signs of 
reform. This then placed the emphasis on South African foreign 
policy to buy time for reform. This is very much Pik Botha’s line, 
and he has presented it as such to me. 
 
VZ: Yes, correct. 
 
SO:  So South Africa was still trying to reach out to the international 
community to get validation of the tri-cameral parliament? 
 
VZ: Yes, it goes back to the days of John Vorster when he was still prime 
minister.  John Vorster talked about a new outward policy. The National 
Party had traditionally been very inward looking and the outward policy 
was saying that South Africa’s access to the world was through Africa. 
We are part of Africa and we have to reach out to our African 
neighbours. Then he made the unfortunate statement that he didn't think 
that his generation would be able to resolve the issue. 
 
 But he appointed - and this was the first practical step in South Africa’s 
reform process - he appointed a Stellenbosch professor by the name of 
Erika Theron to head what became known as the Theron Commission 
essentially on the future of the coloured people, because you could 
argue, at least at high theoretical level, that the separate development 
policy - as apartheid was then called - was justified on the grounds of 
language, culture and various other things; that each ethnic group in this 
country should have the freedom to govern itself in its own territory, 
according to its own rules, traditions, values, culture, and language and 
so forth. In that separate development logic, there was no place for the 
coloured people. You couldn’t locate them anywhere; they were not a 
separate ethic group. 
 
 So how do we deal with this? Erika Theron, who was a sociologist from 
the University of Stellenbosch, authored the Theron Report which was 
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very influential. And it set a number of thinkers on the path to developing 
some kind of way of resolving South Africa’s constitutional impasse. It 
went on for a number of years; there were so many committees in 
Parliament, committees of academics. Ultimately we landed up with a 
tri-cameral parliament which could only be the product of a committee. 
 
SO:  Yes, an animal that didn’t make sense! 
 
VZ: No rational individual would design it that way; so if you wanted to 
design a donkey, get a committee to do it... and this is pretty much what 
happened, and then a referendum was held. So you're absolutely right 
in the sense of the thinking that “We must change” was there, and there 
were endless committees and reports. We can go back and look at all 
those documents today. Some of them are rather amusing to read by 
today’s standards. Some of them would make you want to cringe, but 
that was the language that was used in the day. 
 
 They eventually came up with this compromise proposal. Now the 
interesting thing about this was that in the referendum campaign that 
followed in 1983 the most popular politician at the time, around this 
country, was Pik Botha himself. I went with him to dozens of these 
political meetings. We would be one night in Parow, the night after in 
East London and then we would be in Polokwane, and then in Kimberly 
and it was just one after the other. 
 
 The reason I was travelling with him (I was a civil servant, not a member 
of any political party) was that while he was doing all the speechifying, 
urging people to vote in favour of this tri-cameral system, he was also 
still the Foreign Minister. There were still incoming cables and urgent 
issues coming in all the time. We were sitting in hotel rooms and in 
airport lounges dealing with these matters. He was filling halls all over 
the country. People were concerned about the future. We were in rural 
towns sometimes, in the town hall, or the school hall, great big 
microphones and outside there would be loud speakers so people 
standing outside could stand there and listen to him arguing the case for 
change. 
 
 He was very, very up front, if you go back and look at those speeches; 
he was saying that this tri-cameral parliament system cannot work. It 
was an unworkable situation. The black people of this country are a 
majority, but are excluded from its provisions. So they are never going 
to find that acceptable, but it has the one virtue that it breaks the current 
logjam: for the first time people of colour will be in government. It’s very 
imperfect, it’s not going to last very long, but at least we take one step. It 
may be a baby step, it may be entirely inadequate and I believe it is 
inadequate. It’s not going to survive very long at all, but we have to take 
this step, so let’s vote in favour of it. 
 
 The opposition, particularly up in the northern Transvaal and places like 
that, were saying, “But you are leading us into the abyss! We don’t know 
where we’re going. You're leading us into the dark forest here and 
there’s no indication of where this will take us.” Pik’s response was, 
“Well, sometimes you have to take a leap of faith. What’s the 
alternative?  If you turn back it’s just as long that way.” 
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SO:  Vic you’ve identified Pik Botha as very much a one-man force for 
change in South Africa at this particular time. Not quite a prophet 
crying in the wilderness, but at the vanguard of change within the 
National Party. Was he also arguing for the release, privately, of 
Nelson Mandela at this particular point in the early 1980s, that you 
recall? 
 
VZ: It started in late 1984 because that’s when the new constitution was 
adopted and implemented. So PW Botha went from being Prime Minster 
to Executive President. The tri-cameral parliament was then instituted 
and so down in Parliament you can all these rearrangements; the 
buildings, Chambers of Parliament, offices and so forth. All the 
parliamentary procedures being rewritten because it meant that every 
budget vote had to go through three chambers and it became a really 
complicated issue. 
 
 Pik was looking at this with growing concern. He was saying to us, “If we 
didn’t think this was going to work before the referendum, I'll tell you now, 
looking at it now, this is going to be very problematic.” But also bear in mind 
that at that time Pik was also dealing with the leaders of the TBVC States: 
Transkei, Boputhatswana, Venda and Ciskei. He was listening very carefully 
to what they were telling him. It was also at that stage that we concluded 
negotiations with Mozambique that led to the Nkomati Accord. So he was 
listening very carefully to President Samora Machel, to Chissano who was the 
Foreign Minister; to Veira and Jacinto Veloso. He was being very methodical 
about taking soundings and what he was hearing was not encouraging. 
 
 There was outright, unequivocal rejection of this constitutional arrangement. 
Pik was saying that to PW Botha and everybody else in the cabinet. He was 
the lone voice at the time. There was no other cabinet minister who shared 
his views. 
 
SO:  I was about to ask you this. 
 
VZ: Yes, there was no other minister in the cabinet who was making this case and 
saying to his cabinet colleagues, “Look, you know, our African brothers, and 
neighbours in the TBVC countries and the frontline States, reject this outright. 
We know that the people within the country are not going to accept this.” And 
this is what happened. No sooner had the new tri-cameral constitution been 
implemented than the internal unrest accelerated. It blossomed; there were 
bombs going off all over the place; in supermarkets and everywhere. We 
were heading for a very, very ugly set of circumstances. 
 
 Now some would have argued that we could muddle through for the next 20 
or 30 years. The ANC as a military force was never going to defeat the South 
African security forces. We could muddle through a bit like Zimbabwe has 
muddled through and other countries have muddled through. But that was not 
the kind of future that any of us wanted. So towards the end of 1984, 
beginning 1985, it was beginning to become clearer to folks that in order to 
break this logjam we needed to do something dramatic. We needed to take 
the initiative back into our own hands and do the right thing, whatever that 
was. And not be scared of the future, you know, embrace it, deal with it. That 
was when the issue of Nelson Mandela’s release began to play on Pik’s mind. 
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SO:  Vic I could ask you now, please, in your view what role did Britain and 
what role did the Commonwealth play in helping South Africa do the 
right thing in this early part of the 1980s? I know that Pik came to Britain 
in December of 1983. Did you come with him? 
 
VZ: No. 
 
SO:  Okay. PW Botha came and met Mrs. Thatcher at Chequers in June of 
1984. Did you accompany them on that particular trip? 
 
VZ: Yes, I did. 
 
SO:  What’s your recollection of that visit? 
 
VZ: I can remember Pik having a great deal of respect for Peter Carrington and 
the way that he had conducted the Lancaster House talks. The outcome of 
the Zimbabwe election took the South African government a little by surprise. 
 
SO:  Very much by surprise. 
 
VZ: They thought that Bishop Muzorewa would do a lot better than he did. They 
miscalculated, and interestingly enough Britain’s, well certainly the Foreign 
Office’s prediction of the outcome was far more accurate than ours, which 
puzzled the South African Foreign Minster significantly. He turned to his 
advisors and said, “How come our British colleagues had a better idea of 
what the outcome was going to be than we did?  Where did we miscalculate?” 
Where there was a fundamental weakness in South African thinking at the 
time was that it was based on ethnic identity; the idea that the Matabele 
would all vote for Joshua Nkomo and the Shona for Mugabe, etc., and the 
majority would vote for Muzorewa. And if you worked it out solely in those 
categories Muzorewa would have done better. 
 
SO:  Yes. 
 
VZ: But the British analysis was far more sophisticated than ours and we made 
the mistake of saying - Pik himself did this, he admitted it later - in the 
meeting with Lord Carrington, “But we are their neighbours, we know them 
better than you do. You live five thousand miles away. You know, we share a 
border with them. We know Zimbabwe [laughter].” Turned out that it was 
completely wrong and the Foreign Office was more accurate. 
 
SO:  But by 1984 of course Carrington was no longer Foreign Secretary; it 
was Geoffrey Howe. When PW Botha came to London after his trip 
round Europe, there was a deliberate decision not to welcome him to 
Number 10, Downing Street, because of that massive demonstration 
along Whitehall and in Trafalgar Square. Do you remember the tone of 
the discussions between Thatcher and PW Botha, or Geoffrey Howe’s 
relationship with Pik at that particular time? 
 
VZ:  I don’t think that it was easy for someone like Sir Geoffrey Howe to 
communicate with someone like Pik Botha. I think it was far easier for 
Malcolm Rifkind or Douglas Hurd frankly. 
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SO:  Why do you think that is? 
 
VZ: I think it was his personality and Malcolm Rifkind probably had a far better 
grasp of southern Africa than Geoffrey Howe. Douglas Hurd was a different 
personality, I can’t really give you a sensible answer, I can just tell you my 
observation was that Pik could relate and talk to Peter Carrington, he 
respected him, and the others as well. 
 
 In that particular visit in 1984 the new tri-cameral parliament had already 
come into effect. The South African government was seen to be making 
tentative steps and trying to grasp for some kind of way out and Mrs Thatcher 
and her government appeared to want to be helpful rather than simply 
condemning and adopting strident views that were not constructive. Mrs 
Thatcher was keen to listen to PW and listened very carefully to what he had 
to say and what his view was. Listen to the dilemmas that the South African 
government faced in Namibia and in the region, and domestically. And why 
the South African government could not simply accede to demands of the 
ANC or the OAU, or the UN because the consequences for us were far too 
serious. 
 
 As I mentioned earlier, it’s one thing to say, “Well, if you take all these steps 
you will be readmitted to the UN and you will be readmitted to the 
Commonwealth and this, that and the other. But then what kind of country will 
you be? Look who else is admitted to the UN. Do you want to look like that?” 
So that was part of the dilemma. 
 
 The question of Mandela and his release was raised at that meeting. I think it 
might be fair to say that it was there that the idea really started germinating in 
Pik’s mind that someone needed to grasp the nettle now and find a way to get 
Mandela released. This could be choreographed in a way that would not 
necessarily bring about PW’s fear of a complete meltdown in the country. 
 
 He started opening this discussion and he was met with initial disbelief, 
completely off the screen at the time. But the more he argued in favour of it 
the more convinced he became that it had to happen, and then he made this 
public statement in February 1986, on his willingness to serve under a 
Mandela presidency. He’d already been talking about it for a while and PW 
felt himself forced to repudiate Pik in Parliament. Then Pik very nearly 
resigned, but the balance of power in the cabinet was already beginning to 
shift at the time.  Younger ministers were coming into the cabinet who 
supported him, people like Barend du Plessis and others. So Pik had some 
sort of modest support growing for him. 
 
 As the debate continued PW Botha eventually agreed to release Mandela on 
certain conditions, such as that Mandela would renounce violence as a 
means to political ends. Pik Botha argued that Mandela could never accept 
that. You either release the man, or you don’t release him. If you want to 
release him and then enter into negotiations with a parolee, that is not going 
to work. So we have to find a way to release him unconditionally and this 
became a big debate within the cabinet. 
 
SO:  Vic, if you could just backtrack slightly please to talk about the Eminent 
Persons Group’s tour of early 1986. This was decided at the Nassau 
Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in October of 1985; and 
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Mrs Thatcher wrote to P.W. Botha immediately afterwards, arguing or 
rather soliciting his support to admit this particular Eminent Persons’ 
Group. I know from talking to Pik Botha that the initial reaction within 
the South African government was remarkably hostile; that they thought 
that perhaps the EPG would be lobbying, or soliciting internal support; 
that there was absolutely no need for this Eminent Persons’ tour. Were 
you aware of Pik’s views on this particular point about whether they 
should be admitted? 
 
VZ: Yes. It’s quite true that the initial response among PW Botha, FW De Klerk, 
Chris Heunis, the leaders of the National Party in the cabinet at the time, 
would have been uniformly negative. They did not feel that the 
Commonwealth had a constructive role to play in solving what was essentially 
a domestic South African problem. Pik argued the opposite; that the 
Commonwealth in fact did have a very constructive role to play. There were 
very, very strident voices within the Commonwealth demanding much tougher 
action against South Africa. He, Botha, the Foreign Minister saw no reason 
why we should not invite these people; why we should not embrace them, 
and ask them to come and look at our situation. Understand our difficulty; 
understand the consequences of some of things demanded of us, and if they 
felt they could play a constructive role, by all means do so. It was very well 
understood by Pik Botha at the time, that Margaret Thatcher was doing her 
best to contain these very strident voices, some of them demanding that the 
Commonwealth take unreasonable steps, or very tough steps, maybe even 
reckless steps against South Africa. This was an attempt on the part of Mrs 
Thatcher to help, not to hinder South Africa’s progress. So it took a while for 
Pik to convince his colleagues in the cabinet that it would be a strategic error 
to turn down the EPG visit. It would be completely the wrong thing to do. 
 
SO:  Was there discussion within the Department for Foreign Affairs about 
how appropriate this EPG visit was -? 
 
VZ: No, the partner for -. 
 
SO:  - or was Pik’s leadership of the Department so authoritative that this 
was just not up for discussion. 
 
VZ: But it was also not up for debate in the sense that nobody disputed it. I mean, 
those of us who were involved in day-to-day management of foreign relations 
saw no problem with this at all. Whereas others in the more isolationist camp 
and working in government departments or political environments that were 
not really associated with the outside world didn't see that the Commonwealth 
had any role to play here at all. “We just left the Commonwealth the other 
day, you know why?  We don't want them to come and tell us how to run our 
affairs.” So it was very difficult to get them to understand that this was the 
Commonwealth, and Britain in particular, reaching out to South Africa and 
saying, “Look, we’re here to help.” We had to try and convince our colleagues 
from other departments that this was not a hostile act, it was the exact 
opposite. So in Foreign Affairs there was no debate about the value of it. 
 
SO:  Was this very much South African departments operating then in their 
individual silos? 
 
VZ: Yes.  
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SO:  You talk about Pik arguing in cabinet where Brand Fourie was also 
arguing as Secretary for Foreign Affairs with his particular bureaucratic 
colleagues in home affairs, in defence etc. I’m just wondering the extent 
of which there might have been a concerted campaign by DFA to try to 
persuade other departments, or am I painting an entirely false scenario 
here? 
 
VZ: No, not all. What would have happened in those days is that the Department 
of Foreign Affairs would have written a cabinet memorandum that would go to 
the cabinet subcommittee on international relations. It would then go to the 
cabinet itself, possibly to the State Security Council, although it wasn't a 
security issue as such. Then Pik Botha was also arguing in his own 
constituency, at that stage it was here in Johannesburg, and to any audience 
that he could speak to - arguing for us to open up to the world and to allow 
the Eminent Persons’ Group, and they truly were eminent persons, to come 
and do what they had to do. He tried to allay suspicions that these were 
people coming to tell us how to run our affairs. They were not coming to 
interfere in South Africa’s affairs. All these allegations made against the EPG 
were ill informed, or misinformed. They were coming to have a friendly 
conversation and it would give us an opportunity as South Africans to explain 
to them what our problems were. So Pik used every platform he had. 
 
SO:  Did you have briefings of particular journalists within the press? 
 
VZ: Yes, he did. He did, he had lots of off the record briefings with Ken Owen who 
was the editor of the Sunday Times, with Alf Ries who was the political editor 
of Die Burger, Tim du Plessis was the political editor of Beeld/ Rapport, Johan 
Pretorius was the political editor of SATV. They were part of the parliamentary 
press corps, and he was one of the few ministers who was always open to 
them. They’d come and have a quick cup of tea with him in parliament and 
he’d give them off the cuff briefings just to orientate them. Very often he 
couldn't give them on record briefings because he was in violation of his own 
party policy. So the report would read; “a senior political figure told Beeld 
today” and everybody knew who that senior political figure was. This was part 
of the guerrilla tactics going on at the time within the National Party. 
 
SO:  Pik Botha has said also that the Eminent Persons Group when they 
arrived were very well aware of how he’d been roasted in Parliament by 
PW Botha, at De Klerk’s and Chris Heunis’ instigation, because of his 
‘black president in my life-time’ remark. 
 
VZ: Yes, correct. 
 
SO:  - and the leaders of the EPG were therefore particularly favourably 
disposed to Pik on this particular score. What were your observations of 
Pik’s relationship with General Obasanjo, the co-chairman of the group 
and the other leading members? There were of course seven in all, with 
Malcolm Fraser as the other co-chair? 
 
VZ: The warmest part of that conversation was with General Obasanjo. It was as 
if they were the two fellow Africans who understood each other: the only 
Africans in the room. The others weren't and could not have the same level of 
mutual understanding. One was an African Nationalist, the other was an 
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Afrikaner Nationalist, and Afrikaners are Africans too. They both came from 
countries that were extremely difficult to govern. Obasanjo had been a military 
ruler, he understood the dynamics of power, managing power in Africa in a 
way that you could not expect someone like Malcolm Fraser to understand in 
50 lifetimes. Fraser was dour, uninspiring, had nothing serious to contribute, 
nothing constructive. He was trying to quit smoking in those days. Back then 
we could actually smoke cigarettes in those meeting rooms and I had a 
packet of Alfred Dunhill cigarettes on the table and he kept saying to me; do 
you mind if I have one of your cigarettes?” That was his only contribution to 
the EPG discussion: smoking Alfred Dunhill cigarettes. In the end, I sent the 
secretary out to go and buy him a packet, but he was still trying to quit 
smoking. 
 
SO:  OPCs? 
 
VZ: I don't say this with any rancour, but he came with no background, no 
particular knowledge, nor any particular interest in Africa. He just was part of 
that touring group. Then there was a lady from the Caribbean -. 
 
SO:  Nita Barrow of Barbados.   
 
VZ: - that’s right, who was charming. She was very pleasant and helpful, and she 
was, I think, really there to try and settle nerves, if there were any, or a 
dispute if one arose. She was going to be the calming factor, but there really 
was no dispute. The conversations were really frank, they were very direct. 
Pik tried to be as open and straightforward with them as he could. He 
understood very well what their brief was, what they were coming to do, and 
he wanted them to be able to go back with as much information and 
understanding of South Africa’s position as possible. So he wanted them to 
have full access, to fly around the Cape, to look at South Africa, to 
understand our problems. 
 
 He would have wanted to take them to see Matanzima in the Transkei: to see 
Lucas Mangope in Boputhatswana, to see Buthelezi in KwaZulu-Natal, but of 
course the EPG weren't allowed to, as these were not leaders recognised by 
the Commonwealth. So part of the debate was “Well okay, you're coming to 
talk to us, but you're already saying who you can’t speak to, because the 
Commonwealth won’t let you speak to Matanzima because he’s Bantustan 
leader. So that’s not politically correct, but what is the value of your report if 
you don’t take them into account?” 
 
 This was a little bit embarrassing for them, but because the Bantustans were 
not recognised, they had a real dilemma. Pik was saying to them, “But you 
have to speak to them. They represent millions of people. They are part of 
what your report has to reflect. You don't have to accept what they say, but 
you do need to go and speak to them.” They were saying, “Well, sorry, but we 
can’t because our mandate doesn't allow us to. We can speak to Mandela 
who is in jail, but we can’t speak to the leaders who are not in jail.” So it 
became a bit self-defeating, that particular element of it. 
 
SO:   Did you sit in on the individual meetings that Pik Botha had with 
General  Obasanjo? The one-on-ones? 
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VZ: No. My job was to be the note-taker for the meetings. I was drafting the 
minutes. In those days you still needed someone to actually write them up. 
 
SO:  What was the Department of Foreign Affairs’ view of Anthony Barber, 
another member of the EPG? He had been British Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, and was also a director of Standard Chartered Bank. He was 
a particular type of British Conservative. Was he seen as arguing Mrs. 
Thatcher’s case in any way, or as an independent individual? 
 
VZ: No, he made no contribution at all, that I can recall. The talking was done by 
Obasanjo. He was the chairman and he was talking and Fraser sort of 
grunted every now and again, but said nothing that I can remember. 
 
SO:  So Obasanjo really led the delegation? 
 
VZ: He led the delegation very well. He handled it exceptionally well. 
 
SO:  Did you have any dealings with Moni Malhoutra who was the 
Commonwealth Secretariat’s designated man for following the EPG and 
writing up their report? 
 
VZ: No. 
 
SO:  What of then the events on the morning of the 19th of May? This was just 
at the point when the EPG was to present their report, when Pik Botha 
was telephoned, early in the morning, by a member of the South African 
Defence Force to report on the bombing of the three Commonwealth 
capitals of Lusaka, Gaborone and Harare? 
 
VZ: Yes. That was a complete disaster. In all the years I worked with Pik as 
Foreign Minister, I don't think I’d ever seen him more devastated than that. 
We had been through a lot over the years. We’d had our heads washed in the 
UN Security Council I don't know how many times. All the drama of life when 
you are the private secretary of the Foreign Minister, when your country is 
going through an excruciating time of uncertainty and turmoil, meant that you 
lived with him virtually every day. This was probably the darkest moment 
when there he was trying so hard to give Obasanjo something; to give the 
EPG something to take back and knowing what the obstacles were, and what 
the difficulties were. Then he as the Foreign Minister not even being informed 
that they had sent in the Mirages and attacked those three Commonwealth 
capitals in our neighbourhood. And there he was sitting and debating with the 
EPG; you know, for him it was unthinkable. He didn't believe it at first, but as 
it happened, as we later found out, the approval to carry out this attack had 
been given a month or two in advance and long before the EPG was coming, 
or we even knew they were coming. 
 
 Military intelligence had been watching the build-up in those capitals, looking 
at what was happening, and came to the conclusion that these were terrorist 
bases becoming a threat and needed to be dealt with; they needed to be 
neutralised. So they made the proposal through to PW Botha somehow, and 
Pik was not involved; he wasn't even aware of it. And PW had given the 
approval that when the time was right, if they believed that there was a threat, 
that there was a collection of weapons and limpet mines that would come 
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across our borders and kill our people, then those targets were to be taken 
out simultaneously. 
 
 So the planning started to carry out the attack, but it all depended on there 
being a clear night at all three capitals. They had to do it at night, but the 
weather would have to be clear, there was no advanced night vision capability 
at the time. So the pilots had to have a very good visual lock on the targets. 
Every night they were ready to go, but there was cloud cover over either one 
or the other, and they could not carry out their mission. So the waiting just 
went on and on, and on, and basically anybody who should’ve told Pik Botha, 
didn't. Then all of a sudden there was a clear night, and the pilots launched 
the attack. They wouldn't have known that the EPG happened to be in town, 
nor who they were, nor the consequences of the attack in the EPG context. 
They carried out an instruction as soon as conditions allowed, after waiting for 
weeks. They had to go and take those targets out, all three targets, and they 
did. The timing couldn't have been worse. 
 
SO:  But the disastrous message that this sent to the Commonwealth -. 
 
VZ: Absolutely. 
 
SO:  - and to the EPG and to Obasanjo. 
 
VZ: There was no way to convince Obasanjo that this was a SNAFU and you 
couldn’t blame him. And if you couldn't convince Obasanjo, much less could 
you convince Fraser and the others. They were convinced this was a 
deliberate set-up and that we had snubbed them. Really all you could do in a 
case like that is say “Sorry”, and shrug your shoulders and try again. 
 
SO:  Pik has mentioned that he tried in follow up letters to revive the EPG, 
the role of Commonwealth involvement. 
 
VZ: Yes. 
 
SO:  Were you involved in any of those follow up letters? 
 
VZ: Yes, I helped draft most of them. He wanted the Commonwealth, well, the 
EPG people in particular, and the governments they represented, to 
understand that whatever happened on that bad morning, which was a 
disaster for all of us, didn't alter the fact that South Africa still had to progress, 
had to make progress, had to advance. And that South Africa still needed the 
understanding of countries in the Commonwealth. That we weren't all of us 
wearing devil’s horns: in spite of the demonization of South Africa, we were 
just normal human beings trying to find a way out of an historical situation in 
which we found ourselves. We wanted the outcome to be better than what we 
had then, but it was very easy, at that time, to conceive of an outcome that 
would be even worse. 
 
 So as a diplomat himself, he wanted to keep the lines of communication open 
and wanted to continue the engagement with the Commonwealth. As I said at 
the beginning, although we were not members of the Commonwealth, he 
always took the Commonwealth seriously. He understood that it had a role to 
play that was positive, that was constructive, and that we would one day be 
back in the Commonwealth again. He had that foresight and he was probably 
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the only one in the cabinet who thought along those lines. But he was the only 
one who had lived abroad as a diplomat. The others hadn't and that was a 
fundamental difference between them. He understood the world in a way they 
didn't, so they spoke a different language. 
 
SO:  Indeed. How far was the Department for Foreign Affairs also using back 
channels to the United Kingdom, to Mrs Thatcher’s government, as a 
way to try and keep those lines of communication open? To keep some 
of South Africa’s few friends in the international community supportive 
while the slow, faltering steps towards reform were being initiated? 
 
VZ: Yes, there were people in the Thatcher government, or in Britain, who had 
access to Mrs Thatcher. One was Sir Dennis himself, the other -. 
 
SO:  Did you use contacts with Sir Dennis Thatcher? 
 
VZ: Well, South Africans knew him. I believe he was on the board of a company, 
or had personal links of some kind, and came to South Africa occasionally. 
When it was necessary to send a message through informal channels 
someone would deliver it. Their son came every now and again, lived here for 
a while, at one time. The other was Laurens Van der Post who could always 
be relied upon to go around and have a cup of tea with Margaret and Dennis, 
and convey a message. I’m sure there were others that I don't necessarily 
know about. 
 
SO:  I’m thinking through the more formal back channels of your 
ambassador in London. Pik Botha has described that his contribution to 
letters in response to Thatcher’s own missives to PW Botha was in 
drafting them; that he would indicate via the back channel to the South 
African ambassador, “Please say there’s a letter coming, she’s not to 
take affront or offence at any particular phraseology.” Were you aware 
of this particular technique of his to try to soften blows that might be -. 
 
VZ: Yes, when Denis Worrall was Ambassador, and later I think it might have 
been Kent Durr, who had been Minister of Trade and Industry. 
 
SO:  I’ll check that, don't worry. 
 
VZ: What would happen was that we in the Foreign Ministry would prepare a draft 
according to Pik’s basic outlines and one of us, it was usually me, would write 
it. If it was going to go under PW’s signature, it would go in draft form to PW 
and occasionally they would change the phraseology, change our terminology 
because they did not accept the way we framed the message. We’d written 
these letters specifically to convey Pik’s message and PW would put a line 
through them and would rewrite key sentences. 
 
SO:  Was it written in Afrikaans and then translated into English? 
 
VZ: No, it was written in English. I’d be given an oral outline in Afrikaans. I’d go 
and write it in English. Then give Pik the draft; he might play with it a bit. 
Those were the days before laptops and all that sort of thing. So we had a 
lady sitting there with a typewriter, three carbon copies, clack, clack, clack, 
typing out the revised draft. We would send the draft over and it would come 
back with PW’s signature, but with some alterations. This caught Pik in a very 
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difficult situation because he had no choice but to send the letter as approved 
and signed by PW Botha. But he did not want it to be misunderstood when it 
arrived at the other end. So he would say to the ambassador, “Look, there are 
letters coming, but please here’s the actual draft.” 
 
SO:  So she’d get two versions?   
 
VZ: Or an oral interpretation of what the actual message was intended to be... 
because someone like PW Botha would think in Afrikaans and his staff would 
translate it into his English, which on occasion was almost incomprehensible, 
you didn't understand what he was saying. You could easily read it the wrong 
way, or it could be ambiguous and Pik had specifically not wanted that 
formulation, but he had no choice. So he had to send a letter, it had to go to 
the British Prime Minster, but he was saying, “Oh, my God, you know, when it 
lands on her desk what on earth is she going to think?” So he had to find a 
way to deflect the problem: to take the thorn out of the message, so yes that 
happened. 
 
SO:  I’m very struck by the way that actually this is officials talking to 
officials, not leaders talking to leaders because Mrs. Thatcher’s letters 
were drafted by her key advisor Charles Powell. So actually you were 
communicating with Charles Powell! 
 
VZ: That’s right, absolutely, and I remember meeting him at Chequers and he was 
awfully kind and very nice to me, a very nice man. So we did have to have the 
back channel. Laurens Van der Post I know was very helpful. There were 
others that I don't know about. I know they existed, not always who they were, 
because it happened on a level that was beyond my pay grade. 
 
SO:  Pik himself has described the EPG as ultimately successful and as an 
important contributor to transition in the Possible Negotiating Concept, 
which was drafted for the EPG, forming a vital starting point for the 
National Party after Mandela was released and after discussions began.  
Would you agree with that interpretation? 
 
VZ: Yes, I would, in the sense that it took the interests of all South Africans into 
account and proposed movement towards a constitution that all South 
Africans could buy into, leading to a country governed by the rule of law: 
where the constitution would be the highest law of the land, and could 
accommodate our various pre-conditions. It showed what the end result could 
look like, and that was something the South African government could work 
with. Rather than simply capitulating to the ANC, and the ANC becomes the 
interim government, and they arrange the elections, etc., which many were 
demanding at the time. 
 
SO:  So the Possible Negotiating Concept was vital for the South African 
government as a starting point, for the National Party? 
 
VZ: Yes. 
 
SO:  Okay. Yes, so going towards CODESA I. 
 
VZ: Absolutely. Remember the demand from the United Nations and the 
Organisation of African Unity was that the ANC were to be regarded as the 
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sole legal representatives of the South African people. Therefore the South 
African government of the National Party simply had to hand over power to 
them. That was the governing logic of the OAU and the United Nations in 
numerous resolutions. But what the Commonwealth was saying was, “No. We 
need to have a democracy here where all South Africans have a right to play 
a role. This is not simply a question of handing power to the ANC. It’s handing 
power to the people of South Africa.” 
 
SO:  So that means BCM (Black Conscious Movement), Inkhata, and the PAC 
had to be involved. 
 
VZ: They all have a role and they should be at the negotiating table too. Now that 
was not in the ANC’s agenda at all. They were simply going to take power. So 
this was something they initially were not comfortable with. You must 
remember who their friends in the world were, you know, it was the Soviet 
Union and there were the Gaddafis, the Cubans of the world. So their 
instincts were not democratic. Also on the side of the National Party 
government the concern was that this was an old British problem. Very well 
intended. When the British left their colonies, when they left Swaziland for 
example, they left them a lovely constitution just like the one they wanted to 
give us, and that did not last for very long. It was King Sobhuza II who one 
day wanted to do something and his advisors said, “Your Majesty, there’s a 
piece of paper, the British call it a constitution. That piece of paper says you 
can’t just do this.” “Well, then we’ll tear up the piece of paper.” 
 
 That happened throughout what was now independent Anglophone Africa. 
The Ugandans, the Kenyans, all were left with lovely constitutions and where 
were they now? None of them were still in operation. So the National Party 
also took a little bit of convincing at the time that this notion of the 
constitutional path that the Commonwealth was proposing was a viable route. 
There were voices in the National Party that said, “Well, ask our British 
friends where in their former African colonies is there still a constitution that 
the last governor left when he got on the ship? Nowhere, unless maybe India 
or somewhere, but where in Africa?” So this was the debate. So on the one 
side the National Party was dubious about the value of this proposal, but if it 
could be implemented and if it could stick, well, then maybe we had 
something we could work with. The ANC itself was not interested, initially. 
Their demand was for a transfer of power, to them alone. 
 
SO:  Vic, you’ve been talking very eloquently about transition in South Africa. 
In the same way that historians argue about when was the end of the 
Cold War? How did the Cold War end? It seems that there is just as 
much of an intense debate within South Africa about when transition 
was, and how was transition? You’ve mentioned elsewhere about the 
racial components, the economic components, the military components, 
the political. Can we say that the Commonwealth did have agency in 
transition, or is that to overstate the role of the Commonwealth, or 
individual countries such as Britain as facilitators in that process? 
 
VZ: I think the Commonwealth did play a constructive role. It would be a mistake 
to overstate it, but it would also be a mistake to underplay the role that the 
Commonwealth had. The EPG was a very important process, even though we 
landed up with those very unfortunate circumstances in 1986. They 
nevertheless gave the South African government an opportunity to 
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understand that here was this body representing more than 50 odd countries 
in the world, willing to listen and understand. The key thing was that it was 
headed by somebody like Obasanjo who could spell out to South Africa an 
alternative vision that South Africa itself, at the time, was too scared or maybe 
too hesitant to consider, and to imagine an end point that we could aspire to. 
 
 So I think that was useful, and I think that Britain’s role was even more so. 
Britain was under tremendous pressure from large numbers of countries in 
the Commonwealth to force stricter, more punitive economic and other 
measures against South Africa, and Britain was feeling that that wasn't 
helpful. You might land up with a revolution or something worse. In the 
broader geopolitical scheme of things those were still Cold War days. The 
prospect of South Africa landing up in the Soviet camp was not altogether -. 
 
SO:  Outside the realm of possibility? 
 
VZ: Exactly, and whatever existed of South Africa’s nuclear capacity falling into 
those hands was not attractive to them. There were a lot of other 
considerations as well. But Britain played a very responsible role in guiding 
the Commonwealth to maintain contact and dialogue with the South African 
government, rather than simply isolating and rejecting it as an illegitimate 
government the way the UN and the OAU had done. So in that sense it was 
very constructive. 
 
SO:  Were you in Namibia in the April of 1989? Pik Botha described a 
particular incident in which Britain was seen, and Mrs Thatcher was 
seen to play a role in helping South Africa? 
 
VZ: Actually no: at that time I was still Consul-General in California (1986 – 1990) 
and I came back to South Africa a year later. So, no I wasn’t there at the time. 
 
SO:  So you missed that particular fraught event? 
 
VZ: I missed that particular one, yes. 
 
SO:  Vic, what was your view and position then watching how Foreign Affairs 
helped in South Africa’s negotiations for transition? So much of the 
discussion seems to lead up to the role of the Commonwealth in, as 
you’ve pointed to, assisting, facilitating the initiation of negotiations; 
Thatcher’s own contribution to the weight of the scales for releasing 
Mandela and De Klerk’s announcement in February of 1990. But what 
about the DFA and the period ’90 to ’94, because that’s an equally 
critical period for South Africa in negotiating the unlikely peaceful 
transition? How important do you think was the outside world in 
supporting South Africa? Supporting the National Party? That it should 
accommodate and give up power. 
 
VZ: It’s a good question and there are various elements to it. The first and most 
important was that the countries of the world had to be convinced that the 
process of reform that De Klerk and his government had embarked upon was 
“irreversible”. That was the word. Everything hung around its “irreversibility”. 
So all of a sudden we found ourselves in a situation where diplomats and 
foreign ministers from countries that we’d never had any relations with at all, 
knocking on our door in the Union Buildings and wanting to establish 
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diplomatic missions, embassies in South Africa, but wanting the assurance 
from us that this process was irreversible. Very often, Pik himself couldn't see 
three or four at once. So people like me and others also dealt with these 
delegations, that’s how many there were. They were not only from other 
countries, but from regional organisations and from agencies and all sorts of 
institutions. We made the point to them very clearly that the South African 
government was not the only party to the negotiations. 
 
 So we could only talk for the South Africa government; if they wanted to know 
what the ANC’s view was, well, “Go and talk to them or the BCM, but we can 
tell you from the South African government point of view there is no Plan B. 
There is no going back. We have to make this work. It’s in everybody’s 
interest for this to work. We don't know the outcome, we’re going into a 
negotiating situation now, we don't know what the final result is going to be, 
but we know what our bottom line is. The bottom line is that this has to be a 
constitutional democracy, where the rule of law prevails and that no one party 
can dominate any other party. And if it doesn't meet those requirements then 
it isn't going anywhere, but we have no intention of reversing anything here.” 
Pik Botha started as a key player in the negotiations, but shortly thereafter he 
withdrew and Roelf Meyer became the point man with Cyril Ramaphosa, in 
the day-to-day negotiations. 
 
SO:   So did Pik Botha withdraw through choice? Or he was deliberately told 
to focus on his brief of foreign affairs? 
 
VZ: I think his brief in foreign affairs because our whole interaction in the world 
was changing fundamentally. So he had to be there to deal with that. The 
second part of it, though, was that among themselves, the senior leaders of 
the National Party saw Pik’s role as more effective as a deadlock breaking 
mechanism. So they pulled him out of the day-to-day management of the 
negotiations until there was a deadlock and there was a bust up. 
 
SO:  And there were a number. 
 
VZ: And there were. And then someone had to go to Mandela and say, “Okay, 
we’ve reached a deadlock. We have to break this deadlock.” 
 
SO:  So unlike De Klerk’s own autobiography which emphasises very much 
his individual meetings with Mandela, in fact there were other -? 
 
VZ: There were, there were others -. 
 
SO:  - other meetings. 
 
VZ: - because de Klerk and Mandela couldn't see eye-to-eye, there was no 
chemistry. 
 
SO:  That’s very evident from the way he writes. 
 
VZ: But there was with Pik. I attended, I don't know how many dinners at 
Mandela’s house in Houghton and in other places where there were three on 
each side: it was Mandela, Mbeki and Mathews Phosa or Aziz Pahad on the 
ANC side; and there was Pik, Rusty Evans and me. There were usually six of 
us. These were off-the-record dinners. Some of them dealt with the future of 
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the Department of Foreign Affairs on the grounds that no matter how radical a 
domestic political change you have, foreign policy isn't affected in exactly the 
same way. There is some continuity; you still are the same country with the 
same borders. The same teachers get up the next morning and go and teach. 
The same pilots fly commercial aircraft. The same ship captains carry goods 
abroad. But your foreign policy is a little bit different from domestic policy. So 
how are we going to handle this? How are we going to restructure the foreign 
ministry and how are we going to realign our interaction with the world? That 
was part of those discussions, and at times they were also used to break 
deadlocks. When de Klerk and Mandela would have a public bust up or even 
a private one, and Mandela simply flat out refused to speak to him, the one 
person he would always speak to and respected was Pik. He knew that if 
anyone had tried to get him released from prison, it was Pik. And he wanted 
to say thank you for that. 
 
SO:  Were there other key Commonwealth individuals who were helping 
smooth the path, such as the British Ambassador, Robin Renwick? 
 
VZ: He had a great role. He was very active, very helpful, great insight and one of 
those ambassadors who really had a very good grasp of his brief. And was 
actively talking to everybody, playing a helpful role, in fact he is fondly 
remembered probably as the best British Ambassador we ever had in South 
Africa, that I can remember in my time. 
 
SO:  I think that he learnt a phenomenal amount with Christopher Soames 
and Anthony Duff in the process of transition in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in 
1979-1980. 
 
VZ: Zimbabwe, yes. 
 
SO:  I’m not in any way down playing Renwick’s own enormous intellectual 
and analytical capabilities. 
 
VZ: Plus his personality: people respected him. They had faith in him, they 
believed in him and the man was genuinely sincere and extremely capable 
and had access to everybody. There were no doors in this country that were 
closed to him, which meant he could be extremely effective and he played 
them with enormous integrity. So I think he deserves to be given credit 
absolutely for that. 
 
SO:  What about General Obasanjo? I know that Nigeria was one of the first 
stopping off points, after Mandela’s release, for Pik Botha. 
 
VZ: Yes, oddly enough I can’t explain this because I don't know why, but it seems 
that relations with the ANC soured a little. But I don't know what the 
background was. Obasanjo was the flavour of the month for a while. It could 
be that he was seen as too sympathetic to the white South African 
government. Or too willing to hear them out. Not treating them like an enemy. 
That could have been part of it, I’m speculating, I don't know for sure. 
 
SO:  I wonder if in any way that the fact that new Secretary General of the 
Commonwealth, Chief Emeka Anyaoku, who was himself a Nigerian, 
played a possible part -? 
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VZ: That’s quite possible. 
 
SO:  - in that? 
 
VZ: That’s perfectly possible. I don't know, but my sense certainly is that the ANC 
love affair with Obasanjo didn't last very long. So something went wrong there 
and I don't know what happened. 
 
SO:  What about international pressure on the South African government at 
critical points? I’m thinking of the Night of the Generals when America 
was identified as being one of the factors pushing De Klerk into 
removing 23 members of his military because of accusations that they 
were involved in covert operations, in illegal military activities to 
stimulate descent with violence between the ANC and Inkhata. Does that 
chime in with your memory that America was playing a pressurising role 
here? 
 
VZ:  I don't know if I have enough information at my disposal to say whether that is 
right or not, but I suspect it is. Remember that when De Klerk became 
president, he had no military background. All those generals owed their 
allegiance to PW Botha. For a generation when PW was defence minister, 
then Prime Minister or President, they had direct access to him, and owed 
their careers to him. They had developed a way of doing things, and of 
communicating directly with PW; carrying out all kinds of operations, and De 
Klerk became president feeling very insecure and out of the loop. He became 
head of the party and the next thing he was head of state, and these generals 
were continuing to carry on as if nothing had happened. He felt he couldn't be 
president if they were continuing to do things in his name or in the name of 
the state, and he’s supposed to be the president. But the generals never saw 
any need to inform him about anything; they just carried on as before. So this 
was heading for a clash and, if I understand correctly, de Klerk warned them 
on a number of occasions saying, “Look gentlemen, you might not like it, but I 
am the president and you will bring this sort of thing to me. You're not going 
to continue as if nothing has happened.” 
 
SO:  There is civilian control of the military. 
 
VZ: Exactly. They probably said, “Yes, well okay”, but then they carried on 
anyway, because in practice it was the colonels and the majors and the 
lieutenants that were actually doing these things; it wasn't the generals. So 
when he overreacted, and it was an overreaction, he fired some people who 
he should never have fired. There were people who probably, as it later came 
out, were wrongly fired in that process. But there were others, the majority 
who were probably correctly fired. They would argue the opposite; they would 
say they were doing what soldiers do. They were told to go and beat the 
enemy. “Now what are we supposed to do? Go and talk to them? We’re going 
to fight them. If you don't want us to do it, then tell us so and get someone 
else to sort your problem out. There’s only one way to deal with this, there are 
certain problems you can only fix with military force. That is what soldiers are 
for”. 
 
SO:  Were you in the Department of Foreign Affairs ever privately concerned 
that there might be a right wing coup? 
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VZ: No. 
 
SO:  So this was just music in the background of conservative far-right 
opposite to negotiations? 
 
VZ: Yes, there were a few romantics, if you can call them that, on the far right 
wing who had that notion. That’s stretching the word a bit, but on the right 
wing fringe there were some who believed the volk would rise. The volk would 
not take this, the volk would not take that: so far and no further...there was a 
bottom line. At some point you’d reach this bottom line and every farmer with 
his pitchfork would arrive in his pickup truck and the revolution would start. 
Realistically? No. I had spent my life, when I had the time, on farms, game 
ranches, in the bush, in wilderness areas, as a hunter and a fisherman all 
over this country, virtually everywhere. I knew a lot of these so-called right 
wing farmers, I knew their sympathies, I knew their concerns and what 
motivated them. I’d sat around campfires with them, hunted with them, and 
spent time listening to them. I thought I understood them well enough to know 
that at heart they are very decent people, and don't want to fight with 
anybody. This notion of a right wing backlash was a political pipe dream and 
as it turned out, while we had the Terre’blanche phenomenon for a period, 
and a few other crackpots, none of them seriously amounted to a challenge. 
The ANC tended to dramatise this more it needed to be, I sometimes thought. 
 
SO:  Playing the political card more than a real card in their day? I’ve asked 
you about the Commonwealth and individual Commonwealth countries 
as a facilitating factor supporting in the role of South Africa’s transition 
and the role of the Department of Foreign Affairs and international 
affairs as the vital backdrop to it. But what of the Front Line States? Did 
they play a particular role between ’90 and ’94? 
 
VZ: Yes. 
 
SO:  In what way and whom? 
 
VZ: Okay, let’s start with Zambia, with Kaunda. Bear in mind it was for him equally 
important to end the war in Angola as it was for us. It was for him equally 
important to get the Cubans out of Angola. Zambia shares a border with 
Angola and that part of Angola that bordered Zambia was under UNITA 
control. UNITA was the government of that part of Angola and if you crossed 
the border it was UNITA that stamped your passport. It wasn't the MPLA, and 
for a long time this ongoing war in Angola was a fundamental problem for 
Kaunda and he wanted to play in the role of an honest broker. Because he 
was sitting with tens of thousands of long term refugees from Angola, from 
that war. In a country where Kaunda couldn't feed his own people let alone 
refugees coming across the border, they were becoming a political problem 
for him. 
 
 So he felt that if anybody could play the honest broker, he could, and he did, 
with all credit to him. I went with Pik, Magnus Malan, and the Administrator 
General of South West Africa, to Lusaka several times where we had a 
morning meeting in State House, and President Kaunda would get a briefing 
from the Administrator General, from our Defence Minister and our Foreign 
Minister on the strategic situation in Angola and Namibia. He would then 
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explain to us what some of his pressures and problems were, and suggest 
that we should please regard him as someone who would try to help. 
 
SO:  So this is in the 1980s? 
 
VZ: Yes, but also later. I don't remember when Kaunda left office actually. 
 
SO:  1991. 
 
VZ: Yes.  Up until that point he was active, he played a role, he was helpful. His 
successor was really not a factor, he was not on the playing field. So if we’re 
talking about the Front Line States and what role they played, up until ’91 
Zambia played quite an important role because we also knew that when we 
had finished at State House, after a morning meeting and lunch with Kaunda, 
and got on our plane and went home, the ANC leadership would be the next 
ones in his office, as their Head Office was in Lusaka. So any message we 
wanted to get to the ANC we left with Kaunda. He would tell us, “We will see 
the ANC this afternoon and we’ll convey your message”. You couldn't help 
but like him, he was a likeable person in that sense. 
 
 On the side of Mozambique we had negotiated the Nkomati Accord. That was 
a very different sort of relationship because there were ANC operatives in 
Mozambique who were coming across the border with limpet mines and 
smuggling guns, and they were robbing banks. As I said earlier, bombs were 
going off in supermarkets, people were being killed on the side of the road. 
This was the liberation struggle in its terrorist manifestation where things were 
really beginning to look not so good at all. Most of that was coming from 
Mozambique or via Swaziland. So the South African government’s message 
to Samora Machel was, “You had better stop this or the price is going to be 
higher than you want it to be.” 
 
 The negotiation of the Nkomati Accord took two years at least. There was 
some very hard talking. They said to us, “Look, it’s one thing for you to say 
that the ANC insurgents are coming across our border, but they're also 
coming across your border. So you also have a responsibility on your side, it’s 
not only ours.” We were arguing to them, “You’ve got a choice. You either 
kick the ANC out of Mozambique or we kick your butt from here to the 
Equator. So that’s your choice. We’re not taking one more bomb going off; if 
one more farmer gets hurt in the eastern Transvaal we are going to let you 
know where that bomb came from. And you don’t want to know what the price 
is going to be, so you choose.” They realised this was a very serious 
negotiation and they agreed. So they kicked the ANC out of Mozambique. We 
concluded the Nkomati Accord and unfortunately on our side we did not 
honour that Accord as we should have, but neither did the Mozambicans. 
There were elements in our military that continued to assist RENAMO after 
we had undertaken not to do so. That was a great embarrassment to us. 
 
SO:  When did you find that out? 
 
VZ: Oh, that was -. 
 
SO:  The Accord broke down within the year. 
 
24 
 
VZ: It took a while, because having concluded the signing of the Accord which 
was in about March ’84 there was a lull; some months went by, and then the 
Mozambique government started saying to us, “Your army is still helping 
RENAMO.” We were saying, “But they can’t be, we signed an Accord, they 
can’t be doing that. What evidence have you got?” And they would say they’d 
received reports from rural villages, of military supplies coming in. Planes 
were landing at night and there were movements of soldiers and equipment. 
We would think, “That cannot possibly be. These people are smoking 
something.” Then as it turned out, these reports were grossly exaggerated, 
but there was some truth in them, and that had to be stopped. And it was 
stopped. 
 
  Military people sometimes do unexpected things in conflict situations. The 
people on the South African military side who had risked their lives to help 
RENAMO had bought into the whole RENAMO struggle emotionally and 
psychologically, and to tell them at that stage that they had to stop and leave 
those people to a certain death was not something they could stomach. They 
knew the FRELIMOs would kill them. The villagers who supported RENAMO 
would be wiped out, and their wives and children raped and murdered by 
FRELIMO... which is what sometimes happened. We sold them down the 
river; that’s essentially what happened in favour of that Accord, in the view of 
those SA military personnel who had become committed to RENAMO. These 
peace accords are never simple things. They have a lot of other implications 
that you don’t always anticipate, and for many in REMAMO it meant the end 
for them. Having once been their allies, we abandoned them to their fate. 
 
 So it’s a bit like you’ll understand what the Poles felt about Churchill after 
World War II; it was a similar sort of situation. Once RENAMO had been 
disarmed they were sitting ducks, and this upset a lot of the SA military 
people who had been involved in supporting them. These things always have 
unintended consequences. It did mean that we were able to secure our 
eastern border. Our northern border was secure. Mugabe had won the 
election in 1980 so a peace of sorts, a very imperfect peace, but a peace of 
sorts had come to the northern border. The eastern border was secured by 
the Nkomati Accord. So what then remained was Namibia and Angola. So I’m 
making a long story of this, but Botswana played a very helpful role in 
allowing us to use their facilitates, their convention facilities and so forth for 
meetings with SWAPO and other -. 
 
SO:  When did that start?  
 
VZ: This is the late ‘80s, early ‘90s, 1991. At one stage the PAC refused to 
negotiate with the South African government in South Africa. They would only 
negotiate on neutral territory and so we negotiated with the PAC in Botswana. 
Also some of the final details that had to do with the independence process in 
Namibia, Botswana was very helpful. Also they hosted many delegations 
coming to visit South Africa who wanted to talk to us about diplomatic 
relations, but because of their own domestic government regulations that did 
not allow them to stay in South Africa, they went through the fiction of staying 
overnight in Gaberone. 
 
 Their governments allowed them to transit South Africa if they were going on 
to Lesotho or Swaziland or somewhere in the neighbouring countries.  If they 
had to fly from any distance they had to come via Johannesburg’s Jan Smuts 
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Airport, as it was then. They could transit South Africa, but weren't allowed to 
put a foot in the country or stay here, unless they needed urgent medical 
treatment. Now all of a sudden, the situation changed and we were going into 
a negotiating process. So there were delegations from Nigeria and Pakistan, 
and heaven knows where else. They were all coming and showing an interest 
and wanting to talk to us; but they would overnight in Gaborone so they could 
actually fly in and, technically while in transit, come to the Union buildings and 
have a chat, do some shopping, and go. I’m not making this up; it took them a 
while to change the regulations. We had a lot of that, and Botswana always 
had a very moderate, very sensible, very pragmatic way of dealing with these 
issues, and wanted to be helpful. 
 
 Lesotho and Swaziland were, in the nature of the case, dependent on the 
Southern African Customs Union and were always caught between the devil 
and the deep blue sea in the sense that they hosted the ANC there. They 
could not otherwise, they were Commonwealth countries, but entirely 
dependent on South Africa. So if South Africa had switched the taps off that 
would have been the end of them. We never did that, but they were never 
really a factor. Nyerere, in Tanzania, was never liked. There was never going 
to be any prospect of a discussion or any kind of cooperation between him 
and the South African government at the time. He was regarded as an 
opportunist, a particularly dishonest one, but he was the darling of the 
European left, so it didn't matter what he did. But if you looked at how he 
governed his own country, and what the consequences were for his people, 
that was something else. So that essentially covers most of them I think. 
  
SO:  You covered them all. I just want to ask you in conclusion then, the 
DFA’s role in managing the TBVC States because they were recognised 
by South Africa as being formerly independent. Was this also part of the 
negotiations and the diplomacy of transition? What was the DFA’s 
relationship with these Bantustans - were you acting as facilitators or 
channels for their view towards the South African government, or were 
their leadership in direct discussions with the multi-party negotiation 
committee? 
 
VZ: They were in direct discussions at least for a while. Their national budgets 
depended on the South African Parliament. Parliament would vote the 
amount which would then be channelled via the Department of Foreign Affairs 
because technically they were foreign countries. So their budget was foreign 
development aid, so to speak, from the SA foreign ministry to Transkei, 
Boputhatswana, Venda and Ciskei. They were very much part of the political 
debate in this country. I can well remember when Pik was chastised and 
repudiated by PW for arguing in favour of Mandela’s release. One of the first 
people to support him was Kaiser Matanzima, who was the president of 
Transkei. Matanzima said to Pik, “Let PW Botha release him, let him come to 
Transkei. He’s my subject. He is from the Transkei, he is a citizen, he’s my 
citizen not yours. Release him into my custody. He can come here and live in 
Transkei freely.  No one will interfere with him, he can live as a free man; he 
can do whatever he likes. He’s paid his price, he’s been in jail, but he will be a 
citizen according to the laws of the Transkei.” That was not going to work, but 
it’s just by way of saying that people like him and Lucas Mangope and others 
were part of the debate around the political future. 
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 Of course, these TBVC countries were very concerned about a future political 
dispensation whereby they would lose their independence. So having granted 
them independence we were on the verge of taking it away. The National 
Party was the only one that could take it away. This was going to turn out to 
be a very unpleasant set of circumstances. So right from the beginning it was 
the view of the National Party government that they could not be excluded. 
They were going to be part of a future South Africa. They were part of the 
leadership whether one liked it or not, or recognised them or not, the fact was 
that they were and their views had to be taken into account. 
 
 I had to go with Pik one evening to Lucas Mangope to inform him that he was 
no longer president of Boputhatswana. That was a very tense, very difficult 
encounter. Mac Maharaj was also there because someone from the ANC had 
to come along. We went to Mangope’s house, by helicopter. We had 
surrounded the place with the military, so tense was the situation. 
 
 Pik said to him, “Mr. President, I’ve come to tell you that you’ve been 
constitutionally removed. You're no longer president of this country”, and this 
got into a very nasty debate. Mangope eventually asked, “May I ask you one 
thing: can I go on television tonight to tell my people that there’s been a coup 
and you have removed me?” Pik said, “No, I’ll tell the people.” And we got on 
the helicopter and went back. That was a decision taken by the Transitional 
Executive Council, the TEC. As we approached 1994 it was agreed that all 
major decisions were still constitutionally the responsibility of the National 
Party, but they would first consult with the ANC through this TEC 
arrangement because the National Party government wasn't willing to simply 
hand over power unconstitutionally to the ANC. 
 
SO:  I have two last questions. I’m very conscious of trespassing on your 
time. One concerns the bureaucratic silos I’ve made reference to - the 
administrative differences of organisational responsibilities in the South 
African government. Did the Department of Foreign Affairs have 
dealings or close contact with Niel Barnard and his intelligence agency, 
in terms of being one of the key initiators in reaching out to explore 
contacts with the ANC? Were you aware of this in the early part of the 
1980s? The second question concerns South African and the 
Commonwealth post ’94. So if I could ask you about the DFA and Niel 
Barnard’s organisation. 
 
VZ: On the first part, yes; there were interdepartmental structures at a fairly senior 
level. That was loosely called the intelligence community, which included Niel 
Barnard’s organisation. It included military intelligence, foreign affairs and 
police, and others whose work had to do with the security of the country. 
 
SO:  The security family? 
 
VZ: Yes, that sort of thing and yes, bear in mind that as the war in Angola 
continued, particularly in the latter part of the ‘80s, Foreign Affairs became 
alienated from Defence. It became very, very difficult for us to try and conduct 
normal day-to-day diplomacy when the SA Defence Force felt no restraint 
about cross-border raids. Once you send armed detachments across the 
border into another country it’s a serious matter. But the military didn't see it 
that way. They were going to deal with terrorists and that was their job, and 
what else were they supposed to do? From their perspective the diplomats 
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were talking endlessly in New York, had been doing so for years, but the 
situation on the ground remained perilous and they had a responsibility to 
protect citizens from being killed by terrorists coming over the border. 
 
 So it was a very difficult debate. Also the Defence Force arrogated to 
themselves the right to start issuing foreign policy statements and political 
statements without consulting Foreign Affairs. So there would be a skirmish 
somewhere in Ovamboland and the Defence Force would issue a statement 
to the effect that, “We’ve had this battle and so many people were killed, and 
SWAPO has finally been broken as a political organisation.” They would say 
something completely ridiculous like that. Twenty years later SWAPO still 
governs Namibia. 
 
SO:  Yes, Magnus Malan makes exactly this sort of reference in his 
autobiography. 
 
VZ: Yes, these were ridiculous statements and so we would go to our military 
people and say, “For heaven’s sake, this is not your job, you're the guys with 
the guns; you go and shoot the guns. If you want to release a press 
statement, let us shoot with the pen. You can’t do both because, believe me, 
you don't shoot very well with a gun to start with, but when it comes to a pen 
it’s a complete disaster. So do what you do best, and leave us to do what we 
do best.” They were saying, “No. You diplomats just talk. Talk endlessly in 
New York and there’s resolution 43- this and 43- that, but we’re bleeding on 
the ground, we’re getting shot. How long do you think we’re going to sit 
around and wait for you to come to a resolution?” 
 
 So we had a fundamental cultural difference. Where the Defence Force felt 
that as long as they had a big enough gun, they could shoot any problem 
away. And if the problems got bigger? Well, they would get a bigger gun, and 
shoot the problem away until it’s not there anymore. Our view was, no, there 
is no military solution to many of these things. You can fight until the cows 
come home, but sooner or later, as the body count piles up; someone’s going 
to have to negotiate a cease-fire and peace.  Create the circumstances for 
peace that do not themselves represent the preconditions for another war. 
We try to do this as best we can.  That’s our job. You cannot do that with a 
gun, no matter how big it is. And please don’t make press statements. 
 
 Now in this debate we had our allies - Niel Barnard was one. They 
understood that there was no military solution: that the military had a role to 
play, but at some point you needed to end the conflict, and the sooner you 
could do that the better, because if you could negotiate from a position of 
strength, you would not find yourself in the position that Ian Smith found 
himself in.  Where you keep saying “No, no, no”, until eventually when you're 
saying “No”, nobody’s listening. You’ve lost the power to say “No.” If you 
know that the end result is going to be you sitting across the table with an 
opponent, then you choose the time and the circumstances under which 
that’s going to happen, and you set the agenda for that discussion. So the 
sooner you can do that the better because our position was still stronger than 
SWAPO’s and the Angolans’. They could not defeat us militarily, but we could 
not lose the opportunity to make peace on favourable terms. 
 
 So the position of Foreign Affairs and Intelligence was that the time to start 
finding a route to political solution was now, not later. Otherwise a long drawn 
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out war would exhaust us in human terms, also financially, in terms of political 
capital and in every conceivable way. And in the end we would be forced into 
a situation where peace terms would be dictated to us, as happened to Ian 
Smith. So if you want to have any say in the peace terms then you need to do 
it at the right time. Defence saw it completely differently. So we did have that 
in the bureaucracy, the silos that you talk about; we had Foreign Affairs and 
Intelligence on one side of the debate, and Defence and the Police on a 
different mission. 
 
SO:  I know that Niel Barnard was making probes, reaching out to the ANC, 
and he was doing it with a very narrow circle. As far as you know, was 
he in contact with Pik Botha about that? 
 
VZ: No. 
 
SO:  Okay, so these were very much on his own initiative? 
 
VZ: Directly to PW Botha. Remember that Pik was at that point regarded as a 
maverick, a loose cannon, who could not always be trusted by the 
securocrats. He was publicly making noises about releasing Mandela which 
had all kinds of implications. He was pressing PW to consider Mandela’s 
release. PW wanted to know whether he could do so. So Niel Barnard and 
people like Jannie Roux who reported directly to PW, started looking at the 
options and making early probes, in order to advise PW on the choices 
available to him. 
 
 The preliminary discussions were to consider how we could choreograph 
Mandela’s release and stage-manage the aftermath. Because we couldn't 
simply one day open the prison door and ask him to leave. There had to be 
an agreement as to how this would be done in a way that benefited 
everybody, that didn't lead to complete chaos. That’s why PW said he had 
conditions, and it took a while to make him understand that you couldn’t do it 
on his conditions. PW’s view was that the South African public, his voters, 
would never understand if you just opened the door and let him out. Then the 
townships might blow up, with bloodshed in the streets. How would you end 
that? How would you stop it? Pik was saying, “Well, talk to Mandela. It doesn't 
have to be that way. We can come to some kind of sensible arrangement and 
agree on the conditions with Mandela. Make sure Mandela understands the 
conditions, but we don’t have to make it a public precondition. You can’t 
humiliate him.” So that was done and took a number of years. 
 
 They first released Govan Mbeki and Walter Sisulu. These were trial runs and 
they worked. But we reached a point where PW himself could not quite come 
to a final decision, a bridge he could not quite cross, but he had a stroke and 
when he resigned FW de Klerk became leader of the Party. At that point Pik 
considered leaving politics and he went to FW and said, “There are two things 
that you need to do.” Essentially they were conditions under which Pik would 
remain in politics. One was the release of Mandela, and the other was the 
nuclear weapons programme; that had to be entirely shut down. 
 
 FW replied that he had already decided to take those steps, and that was 
August ’89. It took another five or six months before Mandela was released. 
By then they were in discussions with various opposition parties, trying to 
make sure that the release of Mandela could be a global event, a joyous 
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event, that would be peaceful and everybody would be happy. It was very 
easy for it to turn the other way if you didn’t manage the thing properly. I don’t 
know who actually did all the stage management, but it wasn't badly done. 
 
SO:  No, you certainly held the initiative there. Just to wrap up: South Africa 
and the Commonwealth immediately after the elections of April of ’94. 
Where were you in the Department of Foreign Affairs at that particular 
point? 
 
VZ:  I was Director of the Minister’s Office during the transition, and one day Pik 
Botha walked out after having been Foreign Minister for 18 years or so. Off he 
went to the Ministry of Minerals and Energy Affairs and he took most of his 
personal staff with him. I decided to stay and the next day in walked Alfred 
Nzo as the new Foreign Minister. Mandela was inaugurated on the 10th of 
May 1994, so this was a day or two after the inauguration. So in walked Alfred 
Nzo and I showed him to his office.  He’d never been in the Union Buildings 
before. 
 
 It was interesting that here was a party coming into office, but they’d never 
been in Parliament before or in the Union Buildings. They didn't know where 
to sit in Parliament or normal parliamentary procedures. Who’s the Speaker, 
what does he do, and how do things work around here? One couldn't blame 
them - having been excluded all those years, they didn't really have a great 
deal of understanding of what a minister actually does or what the constitution 
allows him to do. What can he sign and what can’t he sign? Anyway, I was 
told there’s a gentleman down at the gate. He says his name is Nzo, he says 
he’s the Minister. 
 
SO:  You had to say to Security, “You need to let him in”? 
 
VZ: The policeman on duty at the entrance said, “Oh yeah? Oh, really, this guy? 
He’s the Minister?” I said, “Look, just shut up now. Ask him to sit down. I’m 
coming to fetch him.” I went to fetch Alfred Nzo. 
 
 You have to understand South Africa to see the humour in this, but it was 
entertaining. Alfred Nzo certainly saw the funny side of it. I took Nzo to his 
office and told him, “That’s where you sit.”  He’d never seen a desk that big. 
We arranged a cup of tea, sat down, and I told him who was who in the 
Ministerial office: told him where I came from, what my background was. At 
that point I offered to stand down. I said, “I understand entirely if you wish to 
bring in your own staff.“ He said, “No, I want to bring in my own support staff, 
but I’d like you to stay. Would you be willing to stay for a year or two and help 
me?”  I said, “Yes.” At that time I’d already been back in SA for more than four 
years. I was both exhausted and exhilarated by the events of those years, but 
it had taken a toll on me and on my family. I was ready for a change, and I 
think it showed. 
 
 My rotation time had come, and I said, “I may have to go abroad again, but 
I’m happy to stay if it’s going to help you.” He said, “Yes, okay, let’s start on 
that basis. I want to bring in my own private secretary and administrative 
secretary, a driver, and one or two others. But I want you to stay as head of 
the office.” Then he said, “Let’s just start working on our immediate priorities.  
1) We join the OAU, that’s number one. 2) We join the Non-Aligned 
Movement. 3) We get our seat back in the General Assembly of the United 
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Nations. 4) We get our governorship back in the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. 5) We rejoin the Commonwealth. That was his sequence.  So I went 
back to my office and phoned Salim Ahmed Salim, head of the OAU, and 
said: “We are a new South Africa. Can we join your club?” We did not have to 
fill out an application form. He was over the moon and excited, and he said, 
“Please come on May 25 “ - that was about two weeks away – “May 25th is 
Africa Day. We want to have a big ceremony in Addis Ababa. We want to 
raise the South African flag among the African nations of the OAU. We want 
to welcome you into the African family of nations.”  So we got a plane and 
went; we had a joyous day in Addis Ababa and South Africa became a 
member of the OAU. Then we were on the plane back to Pretoria when the 
pilots relayed a message; don’t stop at Waterkloof Air Force Base, carry on to 
Cape Town because the Minister has to make his maiden speech in 
Parliament the next day on South Africa’s new foreign policy. This caught 
Alfred Nzo entirely by surprise. So he asked me to write his maiden speech. I 
sat on the plane there and thought: I’ve been writing this kind of thing for Pik 
for years. Now I’m writing it for an entirely different government and the 
Minister has his own staff on the plane. I said, “You’ve got your own ANC 
staff; let them write it!” “No, no, you know how a speech must look like for 
Parliament - only eight or ten minutes or something like that”. I knew Alfred 
had a fairly slow delivery and an eight-minute speech would not be long, but it 
would lay down the basic outlines for the Mandela government’s new foreign 
policy. I wrote it out on the plane and when we landed at Ysterplaat Air Force 
Base in Cape Town I took it straight to the office, to one of the secretaries 
who typed it out. And 19 years later it hasn't changed much. If you look at the 
formulations; I just sucked them out of my thumb on the aeroplane coming 
back from Addis Ababa, and some of it is still exactly word for word -. 
 
SO:  Here’s the template? 
 
VZ: You know, it had been extrapolated from a lot of other things that had 
happened, but the basic heart and soul of the stuff is still the same thing. 
Subsequently we joined the Non-Aligned Movement. As it happened there 
was a NAM meeting in Cairo. We joined in Cairo, and the following year there 
was the Bandung 40th anniversary meeting of NAM in Indonesia, which we 
went to. We went to Vienna to reclaim our position in the IAEA: we went to 
New York to reclaim our seat in the UN General Assembly; and the last one 
was the Commonwealth. 
 
 That was in Westminster Abbey, I think it was June 1995 and Mandela 
couldn’t go to it. He sent Thabo Mbeki. I think Mandela had just an eye 
operation or something, and couldn’t travel. So off we went to London for 
South Africa’s readmission to the Commonwealth. We had the service in the 
Abbey. For me, one of the endearing moments was to see the Queen Mother, 
who was then very elderly, struggling a little bit, but there she was. She’d 
been ill. It was as if nothing would keep her away; and brave, and you know, 
there’s something about the Queen Mother at that ceremony that you just had 
to love. Looking very elegant and very dignified and there she came walking 
up the aisle. I thought, “My God, there’s something lovely about that!” 
 
 Then Tutu delivered himself of a, I don't know if you’d call it a sermon, from 
the pulpit. But with Tutu you never quite know whether it’s a sermon or a 
political speech or a mixture of the two. Anyway, we were admitted to the 
Commonwealth and we had a big function at Marlborough House shortly after 
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that. Prince Charles was there. His only interest was in the jazz band that was 
playing music there. He didn't seem to be much interested in the 
Commonwealth. 
 
SO:  The Queen wasn't there? 
 
VZ: Oh, yes. 
 
SO:  I was going to say, you mentioned the Queen Mother, you mentioned 
Prince Charles. But I was thinking where’s the head of the 
Commonwealth? 
 
VZ: She was there; sorry if I omitted to mention that, but it was just that our 
attention was on the Queen Mother. All of us knew that the Queen Mother 
was elderly, hadn't been well, and there was a lot of speculation about her 
health in the press. And there she was, walking-stick and all, unaided, and 
there was just something great about that. Malcolm Rifkind was Defence 
Secretary, and we also went to see him. He gave us the bad news that the 
Royal Air Force couldn't buy the Rooivalk helicopter essentially because, 
whatever its merits as a helicopter, it was only useful if fitted with Hellfire 
missiles. Lockheed Martin, the manufacturer of Hellfire missiles said, “With 
pleasure you can buy them, but you're not going to stick them on any 
helicopter but ours. You can fit them to an American helicopter, but not on 
any other helicopter”, and so that was that. We had a separate meeting with 
Douglas Hurd; at the time I think he was Foreign Secretary -. 
 
SO:  Yes. 
 
VZ: - to formerly welcome us back into the Commonwealth. There I saw - I’m sure 
Douglas Hurd would not want to hear me saying this - but he was much more 
uncomfortable with Alfred Nzo that he had been with Pik Botha. This was 
Douglas Hurd out of his depth entirely. 
 
SO:  So the personal chemistry that he had had with Pik Botha wasn't there 
with the new South African Foreign Minister? 
 
VZ: It was there in a polite sort of way, but forced and a bit stiff. It’s probably going 
too far to say that there was a great deal of personal chemistry with Pik, but 
he had more in common with Pik than with Alfred. 
 
SO:  Pik certainly argued that there was! 
 
VZ: - well, fair enough, maybe in Pik’s view there was. 
 
SO:  I’m just wondering if you would say that that was the case. 
 
VZ: There was certainly more with Malcolm Rifkind, who showed more knowledge 
and understanding of Africa. Hurd was a different kind of personality. All of a 
sudden, Alfred Nzo was sitting in front of Douglas Hurd, and Hurd was 
blinking and not quite knowing what to say. 
 
SO:  So were you still Director of the Minister’s office at the time of the 
Auckland summit in ’95? 
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VZ: Yes. 
 
SO:  So did you go down there? I know that that CHOGMs are primarily for 
heads of government, and that Mandela obviously was a particularly 
important figure at Auckland. 
 
VZ: No. I started withdrawing from the travel schedule around the middle of 1995 
because my race was run, so to speak. I’d done my job and I was being 
appointed ambassador to Poland. I started preparing for my transfer to 
Warsaw. I was still running the Minister’s office, but essentially not travelling 
anymore. That was an interim period, to enable my successor to start taking 
over from me. It was a transitional time for me so I didn't go to Auckland for 
that CHOGM. 
 
SO:  Vic, thank you so very much indeed for a long and fascinating interview. 
 
[END OF AUDIOFILE] 
